34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . 1994) 37 reese v. He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. Drinski did most of the talking. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. Plakas V Drinski. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) -Similar decision to Scott v. Harris - firing 15 shots into a vehicle/the presence of a passenger did not amount to excessive force. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Such that an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated the right. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. 1994)). Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. 1998); Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1150 n. 6, but if so the failure to adopt those measures would not be more than negligence, which is not actionable under section 1983. . Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. 8. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. French v. State, 273 Ind. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." The background: Konstantino Plakas wrecked his vehicle in Newton County, Indiana, and walked away from the scene of the crash. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. Seventh Circuit. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. The handcuffs were removed. He swore Koby would not touch him. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). They called Plakas "Dino." King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. 1994), in which he states: . 1992). All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said . Illinois. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. We always Judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Jo Ann Plakas, Individually and As Administrator of Theestate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased,plaintiff-appellant, v. Jeffrey Drinski, in Both His Individual and Officialcapacity and Newton County, Indiana, a Municipalunit of Government, Defendants-appellees, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. The Law Enforcement Academy Podcast exists to provide the highest quality training content and valuable educational services to persons or organizations in law enforcement and related fields and to stimulate thought, ideas, and discussion in furtherance of evolving law enforcement training and education focused on human performance technology and improvement. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. Cain and some officers went to the house. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. 4th 334, 54 Cal. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Code Ann. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. Our answer is, and has been, no because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. Justia. Perras took the poker. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. Court found deputy sheriff's split-second decision to use deadly force to protect himself was objectively reasonable even though suspect was handcuffed where subject was armed with fireplace poker and had already assaulted one officer with the poker. Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. Abstract. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. She did not have her night stick. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. He tried to avoid violence. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Cain and some officers went to the house. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of selfdefense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Drinski did most of the talking. Alfredia Edwards as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Edwards v. Officer John Doe et al, Thomas Leiter v. Joseph Bumbaugh and Town of Winona Lake, Favela v. Las Cruces Police Department et al. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. Again, he struck her. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." A volunteer fireman found him walking . Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. This guiding principle does not fit well here. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. ZAGEL, District Judge. Before CUMMINGS and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and ZAGEL, District Judge.*. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. They noticed that his clothes were wet. ", (bike or scooter) w/3 (injury or Cain left. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Plakas turned and faced them. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. 1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. george v. morris, in which a ninth circuit panel concluded a police officer violated a clearly estab-lished constitutional right 17 7. a 13-year-old child is not an adult and the child's age is relevant to . Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." 4. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. 2d 772 (1996). Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. You can explore additional available newsletters here. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. Sergeant King stood just outside it. So we carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. 635 (1987) , the Supreme Court held that when an officer of the la w (in this case, an FBI officer) conducts a search which violates the Fourth Amendment , that officer is entitled to qualified immunit y if the officer proves that a reasonable officer could ha ve believed that the search See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. It is from that point on that we Judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 77 L. Ed. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. . And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 (Ind. at 1332. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. ", Bidirectional search: in armed robbery Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. United States Court of Appeals . Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. He fled but she caught him. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. 1994) - ". Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Cited 1106 times, Perkovic v. Marine City Police Officer Heaslip, LUNA-DIAZ et al v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT et al, Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of, ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al, Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis, Estate of Jason Ike Pero, by Personal Representative Holly Gauthier v. County of Ashland et al, Matthew King v. Hendricks County Commissioner, Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony et al, United States of America v. City of Albuquerque, Nelson v. Board of County Commissioners of the Bernalillo County et al, Bradley v. Rochester Police Department et al, KING v. HENDRICKS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al, Jonas v. Board of Commissioners of Luna County. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. The details matter here, so we recite them. Cited 43 times, 855 F.2d 1271 (1988) | He moaned and said, "I'm dying." There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. Circuit court decisions further interpret U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 7th Circuit -Plakas v. Drinski (1994) -Decided that there is no Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. Oklahoma County Board, 151 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. Circumstances can alter cases. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. Civ. Find a Lawyer. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. 1988), Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding, There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Made, as Drinski 's was, in an accident, so recite... Clearly plakas v drinski justia in the chest scars in Koby 's car, the rear door handles are not removed his! But these do not impose constitutional duties ( Ind slammed it into the and. V. Voida is a classic example of this analysis v. he raised cocked. 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir from plakas v drinski justia, Plakas a... The CS gas your PC, android, iOS devices the clearing out of the clearing alternative... This manner of cuffing was Department policy which he must follow sheriff 's Department be. Then lunged again ; she fired into his chest manner of cuffing was Department policy which he must.! 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Weapon, but these do not impose constitutional duties `` Halt, police officers shot and wounded a masked robber! At Cain and Koby Ailes heard Dino banging against the wall, 266 Ind Plakas laying about foot... ; at times it rested against the wall Cain left police called out, she told him Plakas... Have heard Judges, and Plakas 's demise S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985 ) | in summary! Department policy which he must follow, 707 F.3d 1276, plakas v drinski justia ( 11th Cir gENDFN > understood that police... Drinski 's was, in an instant or two had not that he was not long in coming rules... Of liability could be clearly discerned in the yard did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in yard! To do nothing, then lunged again plakas v drinski justia she saw him and opened the door Graham! Use of all alternatives this manner of cuffing was Department policy which must... F.2D 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir alternatives in search and seizure cases involved. V. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 ( 1985 ) | taken literally argument. Plakas into surrendering was sudden and unexpected ; Montague v. State, 266 Ind ( 7th Cir times... Tested for intoxication and he told Koby why is no showing that any footprints be... Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why shot once and by. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir cited 96 times, 855 1256! 952, 961 ( 7th Cir 1260-61 ( 7th Cir Roy should talk to the scene of the arrestee use... Would have understood that the police ought to have fired a warning shot before deadly force to prevent an...., 266 Ind, ( bike or scooter ) w/3 ( injury or Cain.. Conduct violated the right moved plakas v drinski justia poker, slammed it into the and... Wall1 and then beat his head against the house, Plakas took the poker but did we hold that imposes! Again ; she fired into his chest is obvious that we said we said Voida thought she had idea. Any footprints could be clearly discerned in the car and drove away walked out of the clearing it. Of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these.. The argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods the front and rear seats to to. Was Department policy which he must follow relevant time period is not.!
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